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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND INEQUALITY
BETWEEN SPOUSES UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
Since 1923 a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equal rights
for men and women has been proposed in almost every Congress.1
The first proposal to successfully pass both legislative Houses2 is cur-
rently awaiting ratification by the states.' It provides, inter alia, that
"[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex."'4 Whether this language
will be incorporated into the Constitution is still uncertain. It is, never-
theless, worthwhile to explore its possible ramifications because debate
over the amendment has focused attention upon certain unsatisfactory
areas of the law and caused legislators to begin considering possible
remedies in such areas.
The legislative intent of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment in-
dicates it is not merely a women's rights amendment but will apply to
1. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S. REP.
No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SENATE REPORT].
2. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment discussed in this Comment was origin-
ally introduced in the United States House of Representatives on January 26, 1971 as
House Joint Resolution 208. 117 CONG. REc. H. 233 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1971). It
was approved by the House by a vote of 354 to 23 on October 12, 1971 (117 CONG.
REc. H. 9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971)) and was referred to the United States Senate the
next day. 117 CONG. REc. S. 16247 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1971). The Senate passed
House Joint Resolution 208 by a vote of 84 to 8 on March 22, 1972. 118 CONG. Rc.
S. 4612 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972). For further information as to the legislative his-
tory of House Joint Resolution 208 see 1972 SENATn REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
3. As of November 14, 1972 the following twenty-two states had ratified the amend-
ment proposed in House Joint Resolution 208: Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1972, pt. I, at 3, col. 1 and
Sept. 14, 1972, pt. I-A, at 6, col. 1. Ratification by sixteen more state legislatures is
required before the proposed amendment becomes a part of the United States Constitu-
tion since approval of three-fourths of the states is required. U.S. CONsT. art. 5;
Hearings on HR. Res. 208 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Hearings].
4. H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The proposed Equal Rights
Amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion. Id.
COMMENTS
protect both sexes.5 It will make sex a non-determinative factor in
the legal treatment of men and women,6 thus guaranteeing that all
persons will be treated as individuals.7  Rather than requiring identical
treatment of men and women in all situations, it will allow for classi-
fications based on unique physical characteristics of each sex." Such
classifications will have to focus on actual differences and cannot be
based merely on sexual stereotypes. 9 Ratification of the amendment
would clearly have wide impact and would markedly affect California's
unique community property system, 10 which at present contains various
sex-discriminatory aspects.
In November 1972 the California legislature ratified the proposed
amendment, 1 becoming the twenty-second state to do so. 2 California
State Senator James R. Mills, Chairman of the Senate Rules Committee,
finally ended his opposition to ratification because he became con-
vinced that "passage of the amendment 'would not materially affect
the legal rights of California men and women and could do no
harm . . .'" and that "'the only real effect [of the Equal Rights
Amendment] on California would be to require Congress to alter
federal laws and government practices which discriminate against
women.' ,,s It appears, however, that Senator Mills is wrong. In-
deed, as noted by Representative Don Edwards of California, chairman
of the congressional subcommittee which initially considered the pro-
posed amendment, it has been
established beyond dispute that women are the victims of discrim-
ination in a number of substantial ways. For example ..... [in
5. 117 CoNG. REc. H. 9360 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Representative
Edwards); id. at H. 9367 (remarks of Representative Griffiths); 118 CONo. REC. S.
4140 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1972) (remarks of Senator Cook).
6. 1972 SENATE REPORT, .supra note 1, at 2, 11; 118 CONG. REC. S. 4135 (daily ed.
Mar. 17, 1972).
7. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23. One standard of treatment for all
persons would not necessarily require identical treatment of men and women
(id. at 12), although some legislators expressed a contrary opinion. For a discussion
of this point see note 19 infra.
8. See note 26 infra for a discussion of permissible classifications.
9. Id.
10. H.E. VERRALL & A.M. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALFORN COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as VEnRAL & SAMMss]:
The character and extent of the statutes defining the system and a course of de-
cisional law peculiar to California, have resulted in a community property system
substantially different from that of the Mexican-Spanish parent system and sub-
stantially different from that of any of the seven other community property states.
It has become sui generis. (Footnotes omitted).
11. L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1972, pt. I, at 3, col. 1.
12. See note 3 supra.
13. L.A. Times, Sept. 9, 1972, pt. 1, at 21, col. 1.
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many states, a woman cannot manage or own separate property in the
same manner as her husband .... Some community-property states
do not vest in the wife the property rights that her husband enjoys.
All of these various forms of discrimination undermine the confi-
dence of many Americans in our institutions and have an adverse effect
on our national morale. Even if these injustices injured only a small
number of our female citizens, they constitute wrongs that ought not to
go unremedied. 14
Representative Edwards thus concluded that "[u]nder the circumstances,
an amendment to our Constitution is not merely appropriate, but it is
imperative."' 15 As to the scope of the amendment Representative Ed-
wards expressly noted that:
In the area of domestic relations the amendment would promote a
full economic equality between men and women. Special restrictions
on property rights of married women would be invalidated.1 6
In his minority view on the proposed amendment, Senator Sam J.
Ervin, Jr. stated that he agreed with the amendment's proponents that
it would require various changes in the area of domestic relations.17
Concerning marital property, he specifically noted that:
Two different systems have been adopted in the United States for dis-
tributing property rights within a family-the community property
system and the common law system. . . . As both systems currently
operate, they contain sex discriminatory aspects which would be
changed under the Equal Rights Amendment.18
It is thus clear that the amendment is in fact intended to affect state
marital property' systems' 9 and will definitely include community prop-
14. 117 CONG. REc. H. 9247 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 41-42.
18. Id. citing Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871,
946 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Equal Rights for Women).
19. 117 CONG. Rc. H. 9247 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative
Edwards); 117 CONG. Rnc. H. 9366 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (remarks of Representa-
tive Celler). Evidence considered by the legislators which suggested that marital prop-
erty laws would be affected by the amendment is found in 1971 House Hearings, supra
note 3, at 156 (statement of Lucille Shriver, Federation Director of the National Fed-
eration of Business and Professional Womens' Clubs, Inc.); id. at 432 (statement of
Rollene S. Wells on behalf of the Unitarian Universalist Women's Federation); id.
at 513 (statement of Representative Robert Kastenmeier); id. at 556 (statement in a
memorandum to the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women by its study
group on equal legal rights); Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the
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marriage by gift, devise, or bequest. 23 When property is acquired by a
husband or wife during marriage, but not as the separate property
of either, it is community property of both spouses.2 4
Ideally, the system is designed to equalize the shares of the spouses in
property acquired during marriage, but in fact it operates in a manner
which discriminates between spouses25 in many areas. This Comment
will analyze three such areas of California's community property sys-
tem: (1) the method utilized to classify marital property as separate
or community, (2) the extent to which marital property is liable
for support rights between spouses, and (3) the allocation of man-
agement and control of the community property. Each of these
areas will be analyzed in terms of the following questions: What
differences in treatment between spouses under California's community
property laws are a result of sexual classifications? What effect will
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment most likely have on such laws?
Should the laws (a) remain unchanged on the ground that a reason-
able classification on the basis of sex has been made,26 (b) be ex-
23. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970).
24. CAL. Crv. CODE § 687 (West 1970); Schecter v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 3,
10, 314 P.2d 10, 14 (1957).
25. This Comment will deal only with discrimination between spouses. It is not the
purpose of this Comment to discuss inequalities in the spouses' capacities to deal with
third parties regarding community property, except to the extent that such transactions
by one spouse are directly related to the creation or destruction of some right in the
other spouse. See text accompanying notes 60-65, 117-23, and 143-44 infra. Thus,
issues such as the difficulty encountered by wives in obtaining credit because of their
marital status will not be discussed herein.
26. Objections have been made to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment on the
ground that it could require absolutely identical treatment of men and women, thus al-
lowing no differentiation on the basis of sex at all. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3,
at 77 (testimony of Senator Ervin); id. at 623 (statement in the Comm. Report by the
Comm. on Federal Legislation on the topic of Amending the Constitution to Prohibit
State Discrimination Based on Sex); 117 CoNG. REc. H. 9240 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971)
(remarks by Representative Wiggins); 118 CoNG. REc. S. 4250 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972)
(remarks by Senator Ervin). However, Representative Griffiths, the Congresswoman
who introduced the proposed amendment, believed reasonable classifications on the
basis of sex would be permitted under the amendment (1971 House Hearings, supra
note 3, at 51), and other proponents of the amendment agreed with her. 1972 SENATE-
REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. It is clear, though, that classifications allowed by the
amendment would be circumscribed indeed. Evidence before the legislators suggested
that reasonable classifications would be most appropriate in legislation relating to a
physical characteristic unique to one sex, such as laws dealing with childbearing, wet
nurses, sperm donation, and criminal acts capable of being committed by only one sex
(e.g., forcible rape). 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 402 (remarks by Professor
Thomas I. Emerson, Yale Law School); id. at 558 (a memorandum to the Citizens'
Advisory Council on the Status of Women by its study group on equal legal rights).
See also id. at 250 (exchange between Representative Keating and Margery Leonard,
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erty systems.20
The basic premise of California's community property system is that
all property acquired through the expenditure of personal skill and effort
during marriage should be shared by both the husband and the wife."1
The community property system, therefore, differentiates between shared,
or community, property and all other, or separate, property. All prop-
erty of married persons in California falls within one of these two classi-
fications.22 Separate property is that property owned by either the hus-
band or the wife before marriage, or acquired by either of them after
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Sept. 1970 Senate Hearings].
20. 117 CONG. REc. H. 9369 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1971) (separate view of Congress-
men opposed to changing the wording of House Joint Resolution 208); 1972 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 41-42, citing Equal Rights for Women, supra note 18, at
946 (discussing state community property systems). Evidence before the federal
legislators suggested that the community property systems in existence contain sex
discriminatory features which would require changes once the amendment is ratified.
118 CONG. REC. S. 4264 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972); see 1971 House Hearings, supra
note 3, at 295 (remarks of Adele T. Weaver, then President of the National Associa-
tion of Women Lawyers); Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Consti-
tutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 501
(1970) [hereinafter cited as May 1970 Senate Hearings]. It was not suggested, how-
ever, that the community property system be abolished. 1971 House Hearings, supra
note 3, at 295 (remarks of Adele Weaver, then President of the National Association
of Women Lawyers). In fact, it was noted that "[i]n community property states there
would appear to be no problem that cannot be solved by some form of the community
system of property, assuming that there is no discrimination as to sex." Id.
21. See generally VERRALL & SAMMIS, supra note 10, at 3.
22. Property acquired by a spouse while domiciled elsewhere, which would have been
community property if acquired while domiciled in California, is termed "quasi-
community property" and is treated as community property for purposes of dissolution,
although it does not fall within the definition of community property, if the parties are
domiciled in California when the action is filed. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West Supp.
1972); Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
Spouses may hold property as joint tenants, tenants in common, or as community
property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5104 (West 1970). Nevertheless, the respective inter-
ests of the spouses in a joint tenancy or tenancy in common will be classified for pur-
poses of division upon termination of the marriage as either community or separate.
Spouses holding property as joint tenants each hold their share as separate property.
Lovetro v. Steers, 234 Cal. App. 2d 461, 468, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (1965); In re
Jameson's Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 35, 41-2, 208 P.2d 54, 58 (1949); Siberell v. Sib-
erell, 214 Cal. 767, 773, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1932). Spouses holding property as
tenants in common have the nature of their respective interests classified according
to procedures described in the text accompanying notes 31-32 infra. If the actual na-
ture of the property cannot be traced but the property is held by an instrument in
writing in which they are described as husband and wife each spouse's share is com-
munity property, absent a contrary intention expressed in the instrument. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972). If they are not so described, the husband holds his
share as community property and the wife holds hers as separate. Dunn v. Mullan,
211 Cal. 583, 587, 296 P. 278 (1931).
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ities of California husbands and wives be altered as a result of the
amendment's application to the California community property system?
I. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY OWNED BY MARRIED PERSONS
Classification of property owned by married persons does not occur
until termination of the marriage.29 By then the original time and
mode of acquisition of the property, which are important factors in the
determination of its status,"° are not always clear. Thus a procedure
has developed by which property is initially classified according to
statutory presumption as either separate or community. 1 The pre-
sumptive status of the property can then be rebutted by proof that the
time and mode of acquisition were such as to actually make the prop-
erty separate or community.
32
The general presumption in the classification process is that all real
property situated in California and all personal property wherever sit-
uated, acquired during marriage by a person while domiciled in Cali-
fornia, is community property.3 3  This general presumption is not sex
discriminatory since whether property is acquired by a husband or a
wife is not determinative of its status. In limited circumstances, how-
ever, the general presumption is inoperative and is replaced by one of
four special presumptions.34 Two of these special presumptions are
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 557-58 (a memorandum to Citizens' Advisory
Council on the Status of Women by its study group on equal legal rights).
29. Marriage terminates in three ways: by death of one party, by a judgment de-
creeing dissolution of the marriage, or by a judgment of nullity. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4350 (West Supp. 1972).
30. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
31. Courts sometimes will not even discuss the presumptions if proof of the nature
of property is sufficient to establish its true nature. When such proof is not forth-
coming, however, the presumptions are necessarily. utilized, and the issue of whether
they have been rebutted will be examined. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
32. Estate of Bryant, 3 Cal. 2d 58, 68, 43 P.2d 529, 532 (1935); Estate of Niccolls,
164 Cal. 368, 371, 129 P. 278, 279 (1912); Mason v. Mason, 186 Cal. App. 2d 209,
211, 8 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (1960).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972). This section also provides that
community property transferred to a trust pursuant to CAL. Civ. CODE § 5113.5 (West
Supp. 1972) is presumed to be community property.
34. These four special presumptions are set forth in CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110 (West
Supp. 1972) which provides, in part:
[1] whenever any real or personal property, or any interest therein or en-
cumbrance thereon, is acquired by a married woman by an instrument in writing,
the presumption is that the same is her separate property, and [2] if acquired by
such married woman and any other person the presumption is that she takes the
part acquired by her, as tenant in common, unless a different intention is expressed
in the instrument; except, that [3] when any of such property is acquired by hus-
band and wife by an instrument in which they are described as husband and wife,
unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument, the presumption is that
such property is the community property of said husband and wife and that
[Vol. 6
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tended to treat both sexes equally,27 or (c) be eliminated as being un-
constitutional?28 Finally, in what manner will the rights and responsibil-
Chairman of the Legal Research Committee of the National Woman's Party, suggest-
ing that certain classifications between male and female, e.g. for life insurance premi-
ums, could be made on the basis of life expectancy differentials between the sexes).
It is doubtful however that many other classifications will be permitted. For example,
although one Senator argued that traditional role characteristics of men and women
should be reflected in legislation (1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 65 (remarks
of Senator Ervin) ), it is clear that the basic intent of the amendment is to prevent
classification based on such sexual stereotypes. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at
93 (statement of Representative Mikva); 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
There are two areas to which the amendment will not apply, thus allowing for classifi-
cations. First, the amendment will not apply to private action. 1971 House Hearings,
supra note 3, at 40 (explanation of Representative Martha Griffiths). Thus social cus-
toms and behavior, not a result of statutory requirements, would be a matter of indi-
vidual preference. 118 CONG. R1c. S. 4138 (daily ed. March 17, 1972) (remarks of
Senator Bayh); id. at S. 4142 (remarks of Senator Cook). The amendment also may
not apply when it conflicts with another constitutional right, such as the right to
privacy. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 402. Thus, the right to segregate
bathrooms and prisons would not be denied. Id. Contra, id. at 73 (remarks of Senator
Ervin) (note however that Senator Ervin does not refute the explanation of Represen-
tative Griffiths).
27. The amendment will require that laws which unreasonably discriminate on the
basis of sex either be extended to apply to both sexes or be declared unconstitutional
and void. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 113 (remarks of Representative
Abzug); 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15; 1971 House Hearings, supra
note 3, at 40 (statement of Representative Griffiths); id. at 162 (remarks of Rep-
resentative Waldie). The state legislatures and courts will have to decide which
course to follow. "[flt is expected that those laws which provide a meaningful
protection [to one of the sexes] would be expanded to include both men and women,
as for example minimum wage laws ... or laws requiring rest periods . . ." 1972
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. Evidence before the federal legislators sug-
gested a similar characterization of laws which should be extended:
Where the law confers a benefit, privilege or obligation of citizenship, such would
be extended to the other sex. ... Examples of such laws include: laws which
permit alimony to be awarded under certain circumstances to wives but not to
husbands; ...social benefits legislation which give greater benefits to one sex
than the other; exclusion of women from the requirements of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967 . . . . 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 557 (a memo-
randum to the Citizen's Advisory Council on the" Status of Women by its study
group on equal legal rights).
Judicial extension of laws to include both sexes has already been demonstrated in
litigation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 162 (remarks of Professor Norman
Dorsen on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
28. The amendment is intended to achieve nullification of laws which are "dis-
criminatory and restrictive ... [such as] a law banning women from a certain occu-
pation." 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. This concept was also expressed
in evidence before the legislators:
Where a law restricts or denies opportunities of women or men ... the effect
of the equal rights amendment would be to render such laws unconstitutional.
Examples are: the exclusion of women from State universities ...; State laws
placing special restriction on the hours of work for women or the weights women
may lift on the job; ...laws placing special restrictions on the legal capacity of
married women, such as making contracts or establishing a legal domicile. 1971
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neutral in effect and provide that (1) if spouses acquire a single family
residence during marriage as joint tenants, for purposes of division of
property on dissolution of the marriage the single family residence is
presumed to be community property,3 5 and (2) if property is acquired
by the spouses in an instrument in which they are described as husband
and wife, the property is presumed to be community property.36
The result of the application of the remaining two special presump-
tions, however, is favorable to the wife. Under the first of these presump-
tions a wife holding real or personal property in her name alone, acquired
during marriage by an instrument in writing, holds it presumptively as
her separate property.37 A husband, holding the same property, ac-
quired under the same circumstances, is presumed to hold it as com-
munity property.38  Thus real property,39 promissory notes,40 securi-
ties,41 automobiles,4 I and bank accounts,43 in the name of one spouse
[4] when a single family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them
during marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property
upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation only, the presumption is that such
single family residence is the community property of said husband and wife.
35. Id.
36. Id. This presumption does not apply where a different intent is expressed in the
instrument. Id.
This presumption has only been in effect since 1935. Prior to 1935 the husband
and wife held the property as tenants in common whether or not they were described as
husband and wife. See ch. 707, § 1, [1935] Cal. Stat. 1912, amending CAL. CIrv. CODE
§ 164 (1872) (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972)). Today this
same result will be reached only where the husband and wife are not described as such
in the instrument. The result of this presumption is favorable to the wife. See text
accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972). This presumption does not apply
where a different intent is expressed in the instrument. Id.
38. Since there is no special presumption applicable to the husband in this situation,
his interest in property is classified under the general presumption as community prop-
erty as long as it was acquired during marriage by the husband while domiciled in Cal-
ifornia. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972).
39. Stafford v. Martinoni, 192 Cal. 724, 728, 221 P. 919, 921 (1923) (land conveyed
to wife presumed to be her separate property); Hogevoll v. Hogevoll, 59 Cal. App. 2d
188, 192, 138 P.2d 693, 696 (1943) (a deed to the wife alone raised the presumption
that the property was separate and the husband failed to present sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption). See also Russ v. Russ, 144 Cal. App. 2d 723, 726-27, 301 P.2d
600, 601-02 (1956) (remanded to trial court for determination whether the presumption
had been overcome by evidence of an agreement that the property was community).
40. In re Estate of Lissner, 27 Cal. App. 2d 570, 577-78, 81 P.2d 448,, 451-52
(1938) (a promissory note from the husband to the wife was held to be separate prop-
erty by presumption).
41. See In re Estate of Baer, 81 Cal. App. 2d 830, 835, 185 P.2d 412, 415-16 (1947)
(a presumption that securities in the wife's name alone were her separate property was
successfully rebutted by tracing them to a community property source (wife's earnings)
and showing that no change in the community property status was intended).
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alone, are classified differently depending solely on whether they were
acquired by the husband or the wife. A wife holds such assets pre-
sumptively as separate property while a husband holds them presump-
tively as community property.
The second special presumption which differentiates the status of prop-
erty on the basis of sex favors the wife when utilized in conjunction with
the first. Under the second presumption, if a wife acquires real or per-
sonal property by a written instrument and holds such property jointly
with a person not described as her husband in the instrument, she is pre-
sumed to hold her share as a tenant in common." Moreover, since the
first special presumption will apply to her share of the tenancy in com-
mon, she is presumed to hold it as separate property." This gives the
wife an advantage since a husband who similarly holds property jointly
with a person not described as his spouse holds his share presumptively
as community property.46 If the husband and wife are in fact co-tenants,
but are not described as husband and wife in the instrument of title, the
wife's half of the tenancy in common is presumptively separate property47
while the husband's half is presumptively community. Thus by presump-
tion the wife will receive three-fourths of the property held as a tenant
in common with her husband."
42. Swart v. Swart, 49 Cal. App. 2d 48, 51, 120 P.2d 942, 943 (1942) (an automo-
bile was classified as separate property of deceased wife by presumption since her name
alone was on certificate of ownership of vehicle); People v. One 1939 LaSalle 8 Touring
Sedan, 45 Cal. App. 2d 709, 714, 115 P.2d 39, 42 (1941) (a car was held to be the
separate property of a wife when registered in her name alone, since evidence produced
by the state failed to rebut the presumption that property acquired by a married woman
by an instrument in writing is her separate property). See Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d
350, 354-55, 240 P.2d 604, 606 (1952) (wife who was registered owner of car and
agreed to allow her husband to drive it and keep it after their separation could not
claim the car was community property, and therefore she could not claim she did not
have power to consent to her husband's use and operation of the car).
43. See Sperry v. Tammany, 106 Cal. App. 2d 694, 697, 235 P.2d 847, 849 (1951)
(the balance in a wife's separate account was held to be community property only after
proof that it could be traced to a joint account in which community property was kept).
44. CAL. CIr. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972). This presumption does not apply
where a different intent is expressed in the instrument. Id.
45. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972) applies to "any real or personal
property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon ... " (emphasis added).
46. See explanation in note 38 supra.
47. See note 45 and text accompanying supra.
48. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 588, 296 P. 604, 606 (1931), reached the result
indicated in the text before the statutory presumptions were amended in 1935 making
property acquired by spouses by a written instrument in which they are described as
husband and wife presumptively community property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West
Supp. 1972). However, the same result will still be reached in cases where the spouses
hold title to property by a written instrument in which they are not so described. Speer
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If the general and special presumptions are used to classify all marital
property on termination of a marriage, and are not successfully re-
butted,49 the distribution of property would be as follows: The wife
would be able to claim (1) 50% of all property acquired during mar-
riage without a written instrument,50 (2) 50% of any single family resi-
dence acquired by the spouses as joint tenants,51 (3) 50% of all
property acquired by the husband and wife by a written instrument in
which they are described as husband and wife, 52 (4) 75% of all prop-
erty acquired by the husband and wife by a written instrument in
which they are not described as husband and wife,5" (5) 100% of her
share of any co-tenancy property acquired by a written instrument with
anyone but her husband,54. and (6) 100% of all property acquired
v. Speer, 209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 241, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (1962) (the husband held
title to his share of the property by a different instrument than the wife).
49. Whenever the actual time and mode of acquisition of any portion of the marital
property cannot be proved, or whenever the terminated marriage was of long duration
so that the presumptions are deemed to have great weight thus making rebuttal more
difficult (Haldeman v. Haldeman, 202 Cal. App. 2d 498, 501, 21 Cal. Rptr. 75, 78
(1962) ), an inequitable distribution of property based on the presumptions is possible.
Even if the presumptions regarding the status of all marital property are success-
fully rebutted, however, the property which is determined to be community, and in
which the spouses are supposed to share equally, is not necessarily divided in half be-
cause of an exception to the general definition of community property which provides
that a wife's personal injury damages received while living separate and apart from her
husband are her separate property. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1972) (In
order to be considered to be living separate and apart spouses must be living in different
places without the present intention of resuming marital relations. Makeig v. United
Security Bank & Trust Co., 112 Cal. App. 138, 143, 296 P. 673, 675 (1931) ). There
is no such exception for the husband (see CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 (West 1970) ) and
personal injuries damages received by him even while living separate and apart from
his wife are community property. California Senator Holmdahl has already noted this
inequality of treatment of spouses and proposed CAL. S.B. 1412 (1972) to make per-
sonal injury damages received by either spouse while living separate and apart from the
other spouse the separate property of the spouse receiving the damages.
50. The general presumption of community property applies with respect to prop-
erty which is not acquired through an instrument in writing and thus the property is
divided equally between the spouses on termination of the marriage. See Estate of
Walsh, 66 Cal. App. 2d 704, 708, 152 P.2d 750, 752 (1944).
51. A single family residence acquired by spouses as joint tenants is presumed to be
community property and thus is equally divided on termination of the marriage. See
text accompanying note 35 supra.
52. Property acquired by spouses through an instrument in which they are de-
scribed as husband and wife is presumed to be community property and thus is equally
divided on termination of the marriage. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
54. By virtue of CAL. CIrv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972), any interest in property
held by a wife through an instrument in writing is presumed to be her separate prop-
erty and fully owned by her.
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in her name alone by an instrument in writing." By contrast, the
husband, while claiming the same amount of property as the wife
in situations 1-3, 56 would receive only 25% of the property described
in situation 4,57 50% of the property described in situation 5,ru and
50% of the property described in situation 6.; 9
Although the actual classification of property according to the above
presumptions does not occur until termination of the marriage, in-
equities resulting from such presumptions may arise during the existence
of a marriage since they are made conclusive in favor of persons
dealing in good faith and for a valuable consideration with a married
woman. 60 Thus, a husband during marriage cannot claim against
a bona fide purchaser from his wife any interest in the property pur-
chased if under one of the classification presumptions the property
is presumed to be the separate property of the wife.6 ' There is no
similar conclusive presumption in favor of a bona fide purchaser of
property from the husband, however, and even if he holds property in
his name alone, an improper transfer of the property by him is void-
able by his wife as to her one-half interest. 62  There is one limited
exception which provides that a purchase of real property from the hus-
band is presumed valid provided the purchaser lacks knowledge of the
marriage relationship.(3  This presumption, however, is not conclusive
and the wife can institute an action to avoid the instrument conveying
title"4 within a year from the date of record of the transfer, and such ac-
55. Id.
56. He receives half the property held as community property. See notes 50-52 supra.
57. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
58. A husband's share of co-tenancy property held with a third party is classified un-
der the general presumption as community since there is no special presumption applica-
ble to him; therefore his share is divided between himself and his wife and he receives
only fifty per cent of his interest in such co-tenancy.
59. Even if a husband acquires property through an instrument in writing in his
name alone, there is no presumption that it is his separate property and he holds it
under the general community property presumption and must share it on division with
his wife unless such presumption is rebutted.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972).
61. See Gilmour v. North Pasadena Land & Water Co., 178 Cal. 6, 8, 171 P. 1066,
1067 (1918) (presumption that wife's share of real property owned jointly with her
husband was separate was not conclusive and could be attacked because defendant was
not alleged to be a bona fide purchaser for value).
62. See Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 140 P.2d 386 (1943) (wherein the wife
sought to avoid a transfer of property in the name of her husband but was unsuccessful
due to her untimely claim and her failure to prove her signature to the deed was gained
by fraud).




tion will succeed if she can show that the instrument attempted the con-
veyance of community property without her consent."5
It is thus clear that California's community property system makes
sex a determinative factor in classifying property as separate or com-
munity. In order to comply with the provisions of the Equal Rights
Amendment, therefore, the presumptive system of classification will
have to be changed. The most likely approach would be to extend appli-
cation of the classification rules to include both sexes. This appears most
likely for three reasons. First, evidence presented before the House sub-
committee suggested that laws pertaining to general marital rights should
utilize the word "spouse" throughout.6 If the California statutes used
the word "spouse," it would be possible to continue the use of the classifi-
cation procedures since classifications of property based on sex would
be impossible. Second, and more specifically, evidence presented at
committee hearings contemplated the continuance of laws which define
the interests of spouses in property and provide for its division on term-
ination of the marriage, but indicated that guidelines for such laws would
require that each spouse have substantial rights6 7 to equivalent amounts"8
of all marital property not acquired as a gift or through inheritance by
only one of the spouses. Finally, the classification rules should be ex-
tended rather than nullified because they do not restrict the husband
from ownership of property; rather they undertake the classification of
property for both spouses, merely expressing a preference for the wife.69
If classification rules were extended to apply to both spouses, the
65. Id.; Gantner v. Johnson, 274 Cal. App. 2d 869, 876-77, 79 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386
(1969); Horton v. Horton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 360, 364, 252 P.2d 397, 400 (1953).
66. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 276 (Dr. Bernice Sandier of the Women's
Equity Action League citing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
67. The Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President's
Commission on the Status of Women (1963), cited in May 1970 Senate Hearings,
supra note 20, at 238, concluded that:
[Dluring marriage each spouse should have a legally defined and substantial right
in the earnings of the other spouse and in the real and personal property acquired
as a result of such earnings. . . . Such right should survive the marriage ...
See 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 295 (remarks of Adele T. Weaver, then
President of the National Association of Women Lawyers): "Generally, the effect of
the proposed equal rights amendment would be to eliminate any discrimination what-
soever in the area of the right to ...community property ...between the spouses."
68. May 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 116 (remarks of Marguerite Ra-
walt): "Mhe proposed constitutional amendment would crystallize a 50-50 marital
partnership principle.. . ."; 118 CONG. REc. S. 4142 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1972) (re-
marks of Senator Cook) (Property owned by married persons, other than separate
property, would be divided on a "50-50 basis" by use of the Equal Rights Amendment).
69. See notes 27 and 28 supra.
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following changes in presumptive classification of property would oc-
cur. Any interest in property acquired by a husband through an in-
strument in writing and held (1) jointly with his wife when they are
not described as husband and wife in the instrument, (2) jointly with
someone other than his wife, or (3) solely by him, would be presumed
to be his separate property, unlike its classification under the present
law. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment would not prevent the
legislature from continuing its conclusiveness of presumption rule. 70
Possibly an argument could be made that the distinctions drawn be-
tween the sexes by the classification rules are reasonable and that such
rules should remain unchanged. This argument, which was actually
made in reference to support laws between husbands and wives, 71 main-
tains that laws providing for the division of property at the end of a mar-
riage should give wives an advantage since they were prevented during
marriage, because of their childbearing function, from developing a
career which would allow them to provide for themselves in later
years. 7  This argument, however, ignores the clear intent expressed
by legislative proponents of the amendment that state domestic rela-
tions laws should not be based on sexual stereotypes, 73 but should treat
both sexes equally, thus denying either spouse any built-in advantages
in community property of the marriage.
I. SUPPORT RIGHTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Although spouses in California have an obligation during marriage
to support each other,74 the community property system places a heav-
70. An exchange between Adele Weaver, then President of the National Associa-
tion of Women Lawyers, and Representative Edwards involved a discussion of the ef-
fects of the conclusive presumptions in favor of a wife in California and indicated
that although the discrimination against men would have to be eliminated, it could be
done by applying the same law to both spouses. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3,
at 294.
71. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
72. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 74 (remarks of Senator Ervin).
73. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; 118 CONG. REc. S. 4140 (daily ed.
Mar. 17, 1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh). 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at
93 (remarks of Representative Mikva).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1970) states the basic concept that the marriage
contract establishes the right to support between the spouses. The husband has a basic
duty established in CAL. Civ. CODE § 242 (West 1970) to support his wife subject to
the limitation of CAL. Civ. CODE § 5131 (West 1970). See text accompanying note
82 infra for a discussion of that limitation. The wife has a basic duty, established in
CAL. Civ. CODE § 243 (West 1970), to support her husband when in need, and subject
to the limitations of CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West 1970). See text accompanying
note 77 infra for a discussion of these limitations. Note that although the provisions
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ier burden of support upon the husband than it does upon the wife be-
cause the wife has to meet fewer qualifications before being able to de-
mand support, and because the property of the wife which is liable for
support is less extensive than that from which a husband can be forced to
furnish support.
A husband generally can demand support from his wife's separate
estate75 only if he has exhausted all community property, all his sepa-
rate property, all quasi-community property,76 is unable to support
himself due to infirmity, and is living with his wife.77 In only one
situation can a husband demand support without meeting these re-
quirements. This occurs when the husband contracts for a necessity
furnished to either spouse while they are living together. 78  In such a
case the wife may become liable to the contract creditor to the extent of
her earnings, 79 her personal injury damages,80 and her separate prop-
erty acquired as a gift from her husband.81
In order for a wife to demand support the only requirement is that
she must not be separated from her husband by agreement, unless
such agreement expressly requires support.82  The property from
which the husband owes support is not limited in any way-his entire
estate is liable.83  Further, if the husband fails to provide such sup-
port, his entire estate can be reached by a third party who furnishes
regarding support duties do not specifically discuss contracts by one of the spouses for
necessities, it is clear that requests for support involve a consideration of whether a
spouse requires some necessity of life. CAL. CIV. CODE § 246 (West 1970). Thus the
provisions establishing the liability of marital property for necessities contracts (CAL.
Civ. CODE § 5117, 5121 (West 1970)) will be discussed in this Comment as well as
the general duty of support which does not depend on the establishment of such a
contract debt. See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra for a discussion of CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5117, 5121 (West 1970).
75. See See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 784, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892, 415 P.2d 776, 780
(1966) (discussing liability of the husband's separate property).
76. See note 22 supra for definition of quasi-community property.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5132 (West 1970).
78. Id. H§ 5117 (making earnings and community property personal injury damages
of the wife liable), 5121 (making separate property of the wife acquired as a gift from
her husband liable). What is deemed a necessity is dependent on the social position
and standard of living of a couple. See Wisnom v. McCarthy, 48 Cal. App. 697, 701
192 P. 337, 339 (1920).
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5117 (West 1970).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 5121.
82. Id. § 5131. Note that it is the duty of the husband to support his wife even
though she has an estate of her own. See In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 175,
258 P.2d 1009, 1013 (1953).
83. See See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776 (1966).
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support to the wife in good faith. 4
Since sex is a factor in determining the extent of a married person's
obligation to support a spouse it is clear that the proposed amendment
would require changes in the support laws. Probably such laws would
be extended to require the same degree of support from both spouses.
It was argued by Senator Ervin that support laws could be nullified by
the amendment, thus depriving wives of support they are legally entitled
to receive,85 but this argument overlooks the Senator's own position that
support laws are not intended to discriminate against husbands by
depriving them of property rights, but rather are primarily intended
to provide meaningful protection for wives.88 In fact, the support laws
provide meaningful protection for both spouses since they give
a married person a statutory right to aid which is not available to a
single person. Such laws will not be nullified but will be extended .
7
Senator Ervin alternatively suggested that if the Equal Rights
Amendment is enacted the primary duty of support placed on the hus-
band should be continued as a reasonable distinction on the basis of
sex because it is a reflection of the reality that women are predom-
inantly homemakers, further the existence of the race, and are unable
to pursue a career during their marriage which could provide for their
support in later years.88 Men, therefore, must provide such support.
This argument, however, ignores the intent of the amendment which is
to base laws on individual circumstances and needs and not on sexual
stereotypes of the functions of a husband and wife.80 Furthermore, much
of the testimony regarding support rights was directed toward estab-
lishing a proper equalization of the responsibilities of support between
84. Id. § 5130.
85. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 74 (remarks of Senator Ervin). This
position was also taken by Representative Celler. 117 CoNG. REc. H. 9245 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1971).
86. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 74 (remarks of Senator Ervin):
To enable women to do these things [raise children and make homes for their
families] and thereby make the existence and development of the race possible,
these State laws impose upon husbands the primary responsibility to provide homes
and livelihoods for their wives and children ...
87. See note 27 supra.
88. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 65-66, 74.
89. See id. at 93 (statement of Representative Mikva). In 1972 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 17 (quoting a report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York) it was made clear that the deletion of sexual stereotypes from support laws
"would not require both a husband and a wife to contribute identical amounts of
money to a marriage." Rather each spouse would be considered as contributing to a
marriage whether in a monetary or nonmonetary fashion, and whichever spouse is the
primary wage earner would be required to provide support in compensation for the
homemaker spouse's duties. Id.
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spouses and not toward continuing discriminatory support laws. 90
The question becomes, therefore, whether the support laws should
be equalized by requiring the same degree of support from each spouse
as is already owed by the husband, or by requiring the degree of sup-
port from each spouse that is now owed by the wife. There appears
to be no reason why support rights between spouses should be more lim-
ited than they are at present. In fact, the legislative intent appears to be
in favor of placing additional burdens of support upon the spouses. 91
One opponent of the amendment has argued that it would make support
more difficult to obtain for the many women who have a heavier work
burden than their husbands due to their participation in traditional
family roles as well as in other employment.92 To the extent that this
argument is true, it can be avoided by requiring the same degree of
support from a wife as is presently required from the husband. Such an
approach would not eliminate any of the circumstances under which
a wife is currently able to claim support.
93
If the support laws were thus extended to require the same support ob-
ligation from the wife as is currently required from the husband, the wife
would be entitled to receive support under the same circumstances as she
is now, but she would be obligated to provide support out of her entire
separate estate without any limitation regarding contracts for necessities.
A husband would be entitled to support under the same circumstances
that a wife is now entitled to support and would be obligated to provide
support from the same property as he does presently. These changes in
the support laws would not necessarily have a direct effect in the mar-
riage because the community property system is not currently used to
90. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 173 (remarks of Norman Dorsen on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union); id. at 330 (remarks of William Rehn-
quist, then Assistant Attorney General); 117 CONG. REC. H. 9248 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1971) (remarks of Representative McClory). This is also the approach taken in
Equal Rights for Women, supra note 18, at 945, which was approved by many
legislators. 118 CONG. REc. S. 4250 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972). But see Recom-
mendation 17 in the Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Status of Women (Oct. 1963), cited in May 1970 Senate
Hearings, supra note 20, at 242-43.
91. 117 CONG. REc. H. 9248 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative
McClory). Even recommendations that spouses not be completely equalized in regard
to support rights indicated a tendency to increase existing support rights. May 1970
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 242-43.
92. 117 CoNG. REc. H. 9245 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Senator Celler).
93. Furthermore, the additional duties of support required of the wife under this
approach would not place her in a position any worse than that occupied by a husband
having similar difficulty supporting a spouse. 118 CONG. REc. S. 4142 (daily ed.
Mar. 17, 1972) (remarks of Senator Cook).
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impose and enforce a particular economic standard on spouses in their
day to day affairs.9 4  However, the amendment would at least require
that any statutes governing marital relationships indicate that marriage
involves equal responsibilities for both spouses, and that financial risks
in marriage are to be borne by the couple, and not primarily by the
husband.
"IH. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In California the husband has always been considered the manager
of community property. 95 For most of the history of the community
property system in California, moreover, the wife not only lacked man-
agerial powers over community property, but also did not possess either
a legal or an equitable estate in the community property. 0 Her inter-
est in such property was a mere expectancy, like the interest which
an heir has in the property of an ancestor.9 7  Only upon termination
of the marriage other than by her own death did she receive any of
the community property. 98
Although it was argued that statutory changes in 1891 and 1917,
placing restrictions on the husband's management and control by re-
quiring the wife's consent to certain transactions, 9 vested one-half own-
ership of the community property in the wife,100 the California courts
soon ruled that the nature of the wife's interest had not changed but
that the husband's management and control had merely been limited
to safeguard the wife against inconsiderate acts of the husband in deal-
ing with the community property. 10 1 Even when in 1923 the wife
was given testamentary disposition over one-half of the community
94. Id. at S. 4144. See Equal Rights for Women, supra note 18, at 945 (dis-
cussing the reluctance of courts to interfere with an on-going marriage).
95. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra for a discussion of the husband's broad
powers as the manager of the community property.
96. Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525, 541 (1861).
97. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860).
98. In re Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393, 44 P. 734, 735 (1896).
99. See generally Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 335-39, 249 P. 197, 204-06 (1926),
subsequently approved in Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 P. 439 (1928), for an
excellent discussion of the 1891 and 1917 amendments and their effect on early Cali-
fornia community property law.
100. Id. at 338-39, 249 P. at 205-06; Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 343-44,
48 P. 228, 229 (1897).
101. Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 339-40, 249 P. 197, 206 (1926), subsequently
approved in Stewart v. Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 P. 439 (1928); Mark v. Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co., 122 Cal. App. 301, 306, 9 P.2d 839, 841 (1932).
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property,10 2 it was held that no title to the community property vested
in the wife during her lifetime.'03 Finally in 1927 the California leg-
islature defined the respective interests of the husband and wife in com-
munity property during the marriage as "present, existing and equal
interests under the management and control of the husband ... "I"
This phrase was interpreted by the courts to mean that each spouse had a
vested interest in the community property.
10 5
Even though the wife's interest in the community property is now
considered to be vested, the wife's privileges with respect to commu-
nity property have not been greatly altered. 106 This is true primarily
because of the manner in which the courts have correlated the defini-
tion of spouse's interests as "equal" with the husband's power of man-
agement and control. The courts have treated the wife's equal inter-
est as merely an interest in a quantitatively equivalent amount of com-
munity property as that possessed by the husband. 1 7  The wife's abil-
ity to influence the use of community property has continued to be
completely indirect through the operation of several limitations on
the husband's management and control which were already in exist-
ence before 1927.108 In 1951 and 1971 the enactment of two stat-
102. Ch. 18, § 1, [1923] Cal. Stat. 29, amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 1401 (1872)
(codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1957)).
103. Henry v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc'y, 5 Cal. App. 2d 141, 144, 42 P.2d 395,
396 (1935).
104. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5105 (West 1970).
105. Estate of Kelley, 122 Cal. App. 2d 42, 43, 264 P.2d 210, 212 (1953).
106. The concept of a present interest in property has affected the wife in at least
two ways, neither of which have a substantial impact upon the use by her of com-
munity property during her lifetime. First, because of her present interest, statutory
actions with respect to community property which accrue to her during her lifetime are
not forfeited at her death, but pass to her personal representative. Harris v. Harris,
57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1962); Estate of Kelley, 122 Cal. App.
2d 42, 264 P.2d 210 (1953). Second, a wife is able to file her own income tax return
indicating community property as income. See Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679,
688-89, 111 P.2d 641, 646 (1941) (wherein the court stated that federal tax cases hold-
ing that a wife in California has such a present vested interest in the community prop-
erty that she may file a separate tax return have no bearing on the question of whether
the husband retained full management and control of community property).
107. See Estate of Gansner, 222 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393, 35 Cal. Rptr. 213, 214
(1963) (wherein the court discussed a wife's one-half undivided interest in community
property while describing the meaning of the word "equal"). Note, however, that when
the community property is actually divided on termination of a marriage, the spouses
do not necessarily receive quantitatively equivalent amounts of community property.
See text accompanying notes 29-65 supra.
108. These limitations are discussed in the text accompanying notes 110-138 infra.
The fiduciary duty of the husband had already been discussed as early as 1910. Lynam
v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal. App. 507, 509, 110 P. 355 (1910) (analogizing to a partnership).
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utes did give the wife direct powers of management and control over
certain portions of the community property.' However, neither the
limitations on the husband's power, nor the divestment of his power
with respect to certain community property, can be considered to have
increased the wife's rights to such an extent that sex has been elimi-
nated as a determinative factor in deciding the nature and extent of
management rights between the spouses.
The wife can indirectly affect the husband's management and con-
trol by (1) asserting the fiduciary duty which the husband owes to the
wife, (2) withholding consent to certain transactions involving com-
munity property, (3) exercising testamentary control over one-half of
the community property, and (4) entering into an agreement with the
husband whereby the status of marital property is changed.
Because of his power of management and control, the law has
placed a fiduciary duty upon the husband to act in good faith toward
his wife while dealing with community property." 0 This duty, anal-
ogous to that of a partner or trustee,"" prevents a husband from gain-
ing an unfair advantage over his wife with respect to the community
property by manipulating it so as to maximize his share upon divorce." 2
The fiduciary duty, however, is apparently a very weak one and has
rarely been applied during the existence of a marriage."8  Unlike a
The consent of the wife requirements were created by statute in 1891 and 1917. See
note 99 supra. The husband's management and control had been limited to one-half of
the marital property on the death of either spouse in 1923. The statutes providing for
agreements between spouses altering the status of property were in existence in 1872.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 5103 (West 1970), formerly CAL. Civ. CODE § 158 (1872); CAL,
CIV. CODE § 5133 (West 1970), formerly CAL. Civ. CODE § 177 (1872).
109. Ch. 1102, § 1, [1951] Cal. Stat. 2860, enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 171c (1951)
(codified as later amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (West 1970)); ch. 578, § 8.6,
[1971] Cal. Stat. 1137, enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1972).
110. Baker v. Baker, 260 Cal. App. 2d 583, 586, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523, 524 (1968).
111. Id.; Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 563, 432 P.2d 709, 712, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Vai v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329,
337, 364 P.2d 247, 253, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76-77 (1961); Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 443, 447, 205 P.2d 402, 405 (1949); Lynam v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal. App. 507,
509, 110 P. 355 (1910).
112. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 563, 432 P.2d 709, 712, 63 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16 (1967); Vai v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 337-
38, 364 P.2d 247, 252-53, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76-77 (1961); Baker v. Baker, 260 Cal. App.
2d 583, 586, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523, 524 (1968).
113. In Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949), the court
held the estate of the decedent husband (W.C. Fields) liable for his mismanagement
during the marriage which involved making a gift of community property without the
consent of the wife. Since the usual remedy of allowing a wife to avoid such transac-
tions was deemed to be ineffective in this particular case, the wife was allowed to col-
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trustee, a husband is absolved from responsibility for a loss sustained
by virtue of an improvident investment,"1 4 he is not required to keep
complete and accurate records of income received and disbursed,1 "
and the only penalty placed upon his failure to sufficiently disentangle the
community property from his separate property is that if he is unable
to trace his own separate property it might be treated as community
property upon dissolution. 1 6
The wife can also affect the husband's power of management and
control by withholding consent to certain transactions involving com-
munity property. California requires the wife's consent in three situ-
ations. First, the husband cannot make a gift of community per-
sonal property without the wife's written consent?-' 7  Second, the hus-
band cannot transfer or encumber as a gift or for value any household
items (furniture, furnishings, or fittings of the home) or any of his
wife's or minor children's clothing or wearing apparel which are held
as community property without the written consent of the wife.1
8
Third, the husband cannot transfer any community real property with-
out the wife's written consent." 9  To understand the extent to which
the consent requirements fail to equalize effectively the rights of the
husband and wife, one need only note what the husband may do in
spite of these consent requirements. With respect to the community
personal property over which he has management and control, the hus-
band has the same "absolute power of disposition, other than testa-
mentary, as he has of his separate estate .... ,,12o Thus, as long as
he does not violate the express consent provisions indicated above, the
wife has no control over his treatment of the community personal prop-
lect her share of the community property so transferred from her husband's estate on a
fiduciary duty theory.
114. Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 566-68, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388-89
(1971). Note that the cases wherein the husband has been held to account for com-
munity property have involved clear violations of statutory rights of the wife. See, e.g.,
Horton v. Horton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 360, 364, 252 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1953); Fields v.
Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 448, 205 P.2d 402, 406 (1949) (the wife was allowed to
recover the value of her community interest in gifts made by her decedent husband
without her consent).
115. Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1971).
116. The wife, however, could also be penalized, through no fault of her own, for a
husband's failure to keep accurate records because she might be unable to prove that
certain property was in fact acquired during marriage.
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West 1970).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 5127.
120. Id. § 5125; Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 566, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385,
388 (1971).
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erty. He is not required to follow any of his wife's wishes with respect
to its management, and there is nothing to prevent him from hoarding,
squandering, or even destroying most community personal property.' 2'
The same appears to be true with respect to community real property
although there is no special statutory provision to that effect. So long
as the husband does not transfer it without the wife's consent she has
no legal influence over any purpose for which it is used.' 22 Finally,
none of the consent requirements imposed on the husband make a
transfer by him without his wife's consent void. Such transactions
are merely voidable and the wife must affirmatively initiate a legal ac-
tion in order to invalidate a transfer. 123
A third way in which the wife can affect the husband's power of
management and control arises because of a statute providing that upon
the death of either spouse one half of the community property belongs
to the surviving spouse and the other half is subject to the testamentary
control of the decedent. 12 4 Under this provision, if a husband dies his
management and control is immediately limited to testamentary man-
agement and control of his one-half of the community property. If a
wife dies she immediately gains management and control, albeit testa-
mentary, of her one-half of the community property. It appears, there-
fore, that the spouses possess equal rights to exercise testamentary con-
trol over one-half of the community property. An analysis from the
viewpoint of the surviving spouse, however, indicates an important dis-
crimination. Whether a husband dies testate or intestate, a surviving
wife must wait until the completion of the administration of her husband's
estate (the time during which a probate court decides the nature of a
decedent's property and how it should be distributed) 12 before she gains
121. VERRALL & SAMmS, supra note 10, at 227-28:
The general language of Civil Code § 5125 gives to the husband the right to
possession, to physical exploitation, and to exchange, mortgage, or sell community
property. In other words it gives to him the incidents of ownership except insofar
as they are limited by specific statutory provision or by equitable doctrines because
of his fiduciary character. (footnotes omitted).
The fiduciary duty is discussed primarily in cases involving transfers of community
property (see id.) although it has also been discussed in a case involving a failure to
disclose the extent of community property on divorce. Baker v. Baker, 260 Cal. App.
2d 583, 585, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523, 524 (1968).
122. See note 121 supra.
123. Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369, 369 P.2d 481, 482, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793,
794 (1962); Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 545, 140 P.2d 386, 388 (1943);
Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 782, 158 P. 537, 539-40 (1916); Beemer v. Roher,
137 Cal. App. 293, 297, 30 P.2d 547, 548 (1934).
124. CAL. PROD. CODE § 201 (West 1957).
125. Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1940).
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management and control over any community property formerly under
his management and control.'2 6 If there are any problems in admin-
istration of his estate, there may be a substantial delay before she
receives full possession and use of such community property. When
the wife dies intestate, however, there is no administration and the
husband receives all of the community property outright.'2 7  When
the wife dies testate, the property passing under her'will is subject to
administration.12  The husband, however, during administration of his
wife's estate, retains the same power of management and control over
all the community personal property passing under her will as he had
during her lifetime,' 29 and only has a forty day restriction on his power
to transfer community real property passing under her will. 30 He is
only required to transfer community property to her personal repre-
sentative to the extent necessary to carry her will into effect.' 3 ' Fur-
thermore, the community property passing to the wife through the ad-
ministration of the husband's estate is subject to his debts, 32 while the
probate court administering the wife's estate does not subject commu-
nity property to the debts of the wife.' 33  She thus may receive less
community property than a husband would under the same circum-
stances.
Finally, the wife can indirectly influence a husband's power of man-
agement and control by entering into a voluntary agreement with the
husband.' 34  There are two possible types of voluntary arrange-
ments: 3 ' (1) an antenuptial agreement,3 6 and (2) a postnuptial
126. CAL. PROB. CODE § 202 (West 1957).
127. Estate of Kurt, 83 Cal. App. 2d 681, 683, 189 P.2d 528, 530 (1948).
128. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 202, 203 (West 1957).
129. Id. § 202.
130. Id. § 203. Note that he may be subject to a longer restriction if an interest in
the real property is claimed by another under his wife's will.
131. Id. § 202.
132. Id. Estate of Hirsch, 122 Cal. App. 2d 822, 824-25, 265 P.2d 920, 921 (1954).
133. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 202 (West 1957).
134. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4802, 5133 (West 1970).
135. It is also possible to establish an agency relationship between spouses. Huls-
man v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 348-49, 270 P. 948, 950 (1928); Stegeman v. Vande-
venter, 57 Cal. App. 2d 753, 759, 135 P.2d 186, 190 (1943). This situation differs
from the postnuptial or antenuptial agreement in that it does not change the nature of
property. Instead, the agency theory serves mainly to benefit creditors of the wife in
situations where a husband has participated with her in transactions which have
resulted in liabilities to third parties. The husband is considered to have ratified
the acts of his wife by his participation (Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 724, 728,
271 P.2d 116, 118 (1954)) and is liable for her actions to the extent of the community
property and his separate property. Meyer v. Thomas, 37 Cal. App. 2d 720, 726, 100
P.2d 360, 363 (1940). Under this theory it can thus be said that the wife has to some
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agreement.' 37 By virtue of the statutes providing for these agreements
spouses may change community property to separate property of one
spouse or vice versa.138  In this manner a wife could gain control over
property which was once community property. The difficulty, how-
ever, is that such arrangements require the cooperation of the hus-
band and are totally unavailable to the wife of an unwilling spouse.
In 1951 a statute was enacted giving the wife management and con-
trol over her own earnings and personal injury recoveries."" This
statute, however, did not eliminate sex as a determinative factor in the
management and control provisions of the community property sys-
tem. Although it follows the same general outline as those statutes
granting the husband management and control insofar as it provides
that the wife cannot make a gift of the community property under her
management and control without the written consent of her hus-
band,140 three differences exist among the statutes giving the husband
and the wife management and control which disfavor the wife: (1)
the wife is given management and control over a very limited portion of
the community property; (2) the wife's management and control is
subject to divestment unlike her husband's power; and (3) the statute
giving the wife management and control does not describe her power
as liberally as do the provisions describing the husband's power and
could easily be construed against her.
First, by virtue of the statute, the wife's management and control
extends only to her earnings and to personal injury damages received
by her. Not only is it impossible for her to manage and control any
items not falling within these two types of property,' 41 it also appears
that items acquired with her personal injury damages and earnings are
not subject to her management and control. The Law Revision Com-
mission Comments following Civil Code section 5124, for instance,
extent influenced the usage of community property. The husband, however, can still
control its use by refusing to participate.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5133 (West 1970). Antenuptial agreements must meet
certain formal requirements. Id. §§ 5134, 5135.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1970).
138. Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 770, 7 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1932).
139. Ch. 1102, § 1, [1951] Cal.,Stat. 2860, enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 171(c) (1951)
(codified as later amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (West 1970) ).
140. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 5124 (West 1970) with CAL. Civ. CODn § 5125
(West 1970) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West 1970).
141. Except to the extent that she may have been given management and control of




suggest that it is impossible for the wife to manage community real
property. 14 2 Furthermore, although the statute expressly provides that
the wife cannot give away community property under her management
and control without her husband's consent,' 43 the legislators did not
find it necessary to expressly prevent the wife from selling household
furnishings or her spouse's clothing without her husband's consent, as
they expressly limit the husband;' 44 it follows, although no case has
discussed the issue, that they did not intend for her to have manage-
ment and control over such property even if purchased with her earn-
ings.
Second, the wife loses the right to manage and control her earnings
and personal injury recoveries acquired by her during marriage if she
commingles such property with property under the management and
control of the husband. 145  The husband, on the other hand, does not
lose his management and control in a similar fashion.
Third, the statute which gives the husband management and control
over community personal property describes his power as an "absolute
power of disposition" such as he has over the separate estate. 46  This
type of language is noticeably absent from the provision giving the
wife management and control.147  Since the effect of such absence
is as yet undecided by case law, the statute is certainly subject to the
interpretation that the legislators did not intend to give the wife a power
as broad as that given the husband.
The only other statute providing for the wife's management and
control was enacted in 1971 and provides that the wife shall have man-
agement and control of her share of the community property to the
extent that it is necessary to support her children. 48  However, the
wife must bring a legal proceeding in order to gain such management
and control.'
49
142. The Law Revision Commission Comment following CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. §
5124 (Deering 1972) states that: "The husband, of course, retains the right to man-
age and control the community real property. . .
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
144. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 5124 (West 1970) with CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125
(West 1970).
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
146. Id. § 5125.
147. Id. § 5124.
148. Id. § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1972).
149. Id. Furthermore, in determining the wife's interest the court will first exclude
support liability of the husband for prior marriages and $300 gross monthly income.
Id. Thus her interest may be severely limited.
19731
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
While classification on the basis of sex has been argued to be rea-
sonable in the area of support rights, the same argument has not been
expressly advanced with respect to management and control.150 Nev-
ertheless, it could be argued that as a corollary to the husband's posi-
tion as the traditional provider of the family, he should also be the
natural manager of the community property.151 This argument, how-
ever, totally ignores the intent of the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment which deems sexual stereotypes as inadmissible factors in a law." 2
Neither sex should be considered as the obvious manager; rather, in-
dividual circumstances and capabilities should be taken into account. 
3
Thus the amendment would not allow the management and control
laws to remain unchanged.
It is obvious that a property system which fails to provide a person
capable of dealing with the property would be unworkable. It thus
appears that nullification of the management and control laws is not
contemplated by the amendment,154 and that the California commu-
nity property laws dealing with management and control would be ex-
150. For a summary of this argument regarding support rights see text accompany-
ing note 88 supra.
151. Senator Ervin did make a general statement that no nation's laws should ignore
the functional differences between men and women, without referring specifically to
support laws. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 65. Furthermore, there seems
to be a prevalent attitude that since the husband is required to support the family, and is
thus the spouse drawing the paycheck, he should have the right to decide its usage.
L. KAowrrz, WOMEN AND TE LAw: Tm UNFINISHED REvoLrUTON 70 (1969) ("the
law often seems to be applying on a grand scale the modest principle that 'he who pays
the piper calls the tune.'").
152. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; see 1971 House Hearings, supra note
3, at 93.
153. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
154. Discussion of the proposed amendment did not produce any suggestions that
management of property rules would be 'completely nullified. Rather, much of the
evidence before the federal legislators involved discussion of the methods of bringing
the sexes into some sort of parity with regard to property management. May 1970
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 147, 150-51 (The Report of the Task Force on
Family Law and Policy to the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women
(April 1968) discussing the Texas method of giving the wife some management in
marital property); id. at 236-38 (The Report of the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women (Oct. 1963) discussing
several foreign nations' methods of giving both spouses management powers over mari-
tal property and recommending that "each spouse should have a legally defined and
substantial right in . . . the management of such . . . property [the other spouse's
earnings and property acquired through those earnings] . . ." during marriage); 1971
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 200-201 (remarks of Marguerite Rawalt, then Vice
Chairwoman and Counsel of Women United).
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tended and made applicable to both spouses. 55 The management and
control laws bestow benefits on one sex and not the other since the
provisions making the husband or wife the manager of property be-
stow on him or her the primary incidents of ownership of that prop-
erty-possession and use. The provisions limiting that control merely
bestow on the opposite spouse protections against its improper use.
There is more than one possible course available in extending appli-
cation of the management and control laws to include both spouses.
First, there seems to be no reason a statute could not be enacted
providing that each couple could decide whether one or both of them
would manage and control their community property. Second, it has
been suggested that the state legislature provide that:
"[E]ach spouse shall have sole management, control and disposition of
that community property which he or she would have owned if a
single person," and if community property subject to the management of
one spouse is mixed or combined with that of the other spouse, it is
subject to joint management unless the spouses agree otherwise.'
56
The third possible solution would be to give the spouses joint management
and control over all of the community property. Since the last approach
is the one that has been taken by several legislative proposals in Cali-
forniaI 51 and since it appears that the first two possibilities could result
in a multitude of creditor problems, with creditors trying to determine
which of the spouses could properly create liabilities on the commu-
nity property, the effect of the last approach on the California com-
munity property system will be discussed here.
If California law provided that a husband and wife should have
joint management and control of the community property it would be
clear that the wife's "present, existing, and equal" interest would include
the right to possess and use the community property to the same extent
as her husband. Furthermore, the limitations on the husband's manage-
ment and control would expectedly be affected. First, there is no reason
each spouse should not owe a fiduciary duty to the other regarding the
community property. Although neither spouse would necessarily be
155. See note 27 supra.
156. May 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 147 (Report of the Task Force on
Family Law and Policy to the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women
(April 1968)).
157. A.B. 1174, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Assemblyman
Hayes); S.B. 45, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator Dymally);
S.B. 76, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator Nejedly); S.B. 1337,
Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator Beilenson).
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required to keep a strict accounting of community property, each
spouse could be expected to have the right to be informed of the use
of the community property because of the joint management and con-
trol. On dissolution of a marriage the wife's burden of tracing would
then be no greater than that of the husband. Second, the statutes
requiring a husband's or a wife's consent to certain transfers of com-
munity property exist only because management and control is vested
in one person. With joint management and control such statutes would
not be necessary. However, there would be nothing to prevent the legis-
lature from requiring that certain transactions (for example, those over
a prescribed amount of money) have the consent of both spouses, as long
as sex is not a determinative factor in the requirement.'5 s Third, stat-
utes regarding administration of a deceased spouse's estate would have
to be brought into parity. Insofar as the husband currently has manage-
ment and control of the community property during the administration of
the wife's estate while she has no management and control of com-
munity property during administration of his estate, and insofar as
the community property is subject to his debts but not hers on the
death of the respective spouses, the statutes are inconsistent with the
idea of joint management and control. This view is already reflected
in proposed statutory changes to the California community property
system.' 59 Fourth, voluntary agreements between the husband and
wife regarding management and control of the community property
would be unaffected since sex is not a determinative factor in their oper-
ation. Obviously, the statutes which give the wife management and con-
trol of certain portions of the community property could be eliminated
as unnecessary-she would, without these statutes, have management
and control, although jointly, over all the community property.
158. In fact, such an approach was suggested in the Report of the Task Force on
Family Law and Policy to the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women
(April 1968). May 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 150-51: "[S]ome legal
control of disposing of property during the lifetime of the spouses would be necessary
so the husband (or wife) could not defeat the rights of the other by selling or giving
away all his [joint] property while living." The Task Force, advocating a minimum
of legal restrictions on the use of property, suggested that consent of the other spouse
be required at least for any sale of the home and for excessive gifts of the joint prop-
erty.
159. A.B. 936, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Assemblyman Wax-
man), A.B. 1173, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Assemblyman
Hayes) and S.B. 398, Cal. Legis., Regular Sess. (1972) (introduced by Senator
Dymally) propose several changes in the procedure for administration of estates of




ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
There are two arguments against applying the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment to the California community property system. First, it
might be argued that because the community property system balances
its sexually discriminatory aspects between the sexes, overall the
spouses are equally disadvantaged, and consequently there would be no
need to change the system after adoption of the amendment. 160 Second,
it has been argued that if the amendment were applied to family rela-
tions laws it would have a tendency to create social disorder; in par-
ticular, it would cause the break-up of marriages.' 6 ' Another argument
opposes ratification of the amendment, maintaining that it is unnecessary
because of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
With respect to the first argument, there is no indication that bal-
ancing inequalities created by sexual discrimination between spouses
within a group of laws would satisfy the amendment's requirement that
sex be a non-determinative factor in all laws. Furthermore, even if
such a balanced system did not violate the Equal Rights Amendment,
the California community property system is not so balanced as to pre-
vent unequal treatment of one of the spouses. The disadvantages of
the wife in the California community property system are more sub-
stantial than those of the husband. She is disfavored by the manage-
ment and control provisions, which regulate the daily use of the prop-
erty. The husband is disfavored by the presumptions classifying prop-
erty acquired during marriage, which are almost exclusively intended
to affect spouses only on termination of a marriage,10 2 and by the
support laws, which are generally not invoked except in the case of
separated spouses.' 163
The second criticism, which is concerned with familial disruptions,
clearly is not applicable regarding classification presumptions and support
160. See 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 66 (Senator Ervin citing Professor
Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School); 117 CoNG. REc. H. 9245 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1971) (remarks of Representative Celler).
161. L. KANoWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 202 (1969);
1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; 117 CONG. REC. H. 9245 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1971) (remarks of Representative Celler). See 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at
66 (Senator Ervin citing Professor Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School).
162. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1972), making the presumptions conclu-
sive in favor of a third party bona fide purchaser dealing with the wife, is an exception
so far as it affects the spouses during their lifetimes.
163. 118 CoNG. REc. S. 4144 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1972).
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rights between spouses, since such laws do not have an effect upon
spouses while they are living together. With respect to the management
and control rules, which do affect an on-going relationship, it is arguable
that a system of joint management and control could actually add to the
solidarity of the family unit because of its explicit recognition of mar-
riage as a partnership in which cooperation and agreement is necessary.
Further, any disruptive influence that might exist could be due to in-
completeness in the change in women's status, and stabilization could
occur when discrimination on the basis of sex is completely curbed.'
0 4
Finally, ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment has
been denounced as unnecessary by those who maintain that the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause could be used to eliminate
all discrimination on the basis of sex.' 6 5 There are some indications,
however, that the Equal Protection Clause would be ineffective with re-
gard to community property laws. There is evidence that the Equal
Protection Clause was not originally intended to apply to women, 00
land it has certainly not been so applied in the past. 67  Recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed'0 8 used the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a statute which gave men
preference over women as administrators of decedents' estates. 00 In
Reed the issue, as characterized by the Court, was whether or not the
classification on the basis of sex had a "rational relationship to a state
objective . . . sought to be advanced by the operation . . ." of the
statute.-r Reed did not treat the classification as being so inherently
suspect as to require the state to prove a compelling justification for the
164. L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 202-03
(1969).
165. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (excerpt from Bernard Schwartz's
book Rights of the Person introduced into the record by Senator Ervin); 1972 SENATn
REPORT, supra note 1, at 29 (remarks of Senator Ervin).
166. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 57.
167. Id. at 167; id. at 195-96; id. at 302; 118 CoNG. RMc. S. 4137 (daily ed. Mar.
17, 1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh); id. at 4141 (remarks of Senator Cook).
168. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
169. Id. at 77. In another case, Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972),
the Court indicated a reluctance to utilize the Equal Protection Clause regarding sexual
discrimination in upholding a black defendant's attack on the constitutionality of a
grand jury. The Court reversed defendant's conviction for rape on the ground that the
process of selection for the grand jury was not racially neutral. 405 U.S. at 632.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, discussed the Louisiana statutory exemp-
tion of women from grand jury duty and stated that exempting women from grand
jury service unless they expressly volunteered for duty gave the defendant a claim
based not on equal protection principles but on his right to an impartial jury com-
posed of a cross-section of the community. 405 U.S. at 635 n.2.
170. 404 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).
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classification,' 7' as must be done in cases of classification by race.172
Therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
the issue regarding the California community property system would be
whether classifications on the basis of sex have a rational relationship to
the permissible objectives of the community property laws. Some state-
ments by the Reed Court and by certain opponents of the Equal Rights
Amendment suggest that a rational relationship might be found to
exist. 173 Thus, a more specific law is needed to eliminate classifications
that, while admittedly discriminatory, might nevertheless be upheld under
the "rational relationship" test of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Equal Rights Amendment will allow for some classifications, but will de-
mand a test much stricter than that being used under the Equal Protection
Clause. .7 4  Furthermore, regardless of the manner in which the Equal
Protection Clause might eventually be interpreted with respect to sexual
discriminations found in California's community property laws, if the
Equal Rights Amendment is ratified it would apply to such discrimina-
tions in lieu of the Equal Protection Clause because of its greater spec-
ificity regarding sexual classifications.
7 5
171. Others have also interpreted Reed as having adopted the lenient rational rela-
tionship test where sexual discrimination is concerned. Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d
1295, 1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972); 118 CoNG. REC. S. 4137 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1972); id.
at S. 4141. But see Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1971) (holding that a classification on the basis of sex is a suspect classification
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause unless a compelling
state interest can be shown for its existence).
It should be noted that the California community property system has never been
attacked on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, even if sexual
differentiation in the community property laws were held to be in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause by the California Supreme Court, there is no certainty that the
United States Supreme Court would uphold that view if the issue were presented to it.
172. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971)
(listing cases holding certain classifications to be suspect).
173. Reed indirectly suggested that there may be some merit in statutes preferring
one spouse in order to avoid family conflict by noting that "whatever may be said as to
the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context
[a mandatory preference for males with the objective of eliminating the necessity for
a hearing in choosing the administrator of an estate] may not lawfully be mandated
solely on the basis of sex." 404 U.S. at 76-77 (emphasis added). Prominent legisla-
tive opponents of the amendment have insisted that there are unalterable role differ-
ences between men and women which rationally require sexual distinctions in state
property systems. 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 65.
174. See notes 7 & 26 and text accompanying notes 6-9 supra, for a discussion of
permissible classifications under the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.
175. See 1971 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 83, wherein Senator Ervin noted that
the Supreme Court is not likely to say that Congress passed an amendment to accom-
plish a purpose which could already be accomplished by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
As a result of the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment several
basic changes would probably be made in California law. First, al-
though California would be able to retain its rules regarding classi-
fication of property, such rules would have to be made equally ap-
plicable to all persons and could not distinguish between spouses.
Second, support rights and liabilities during marriage would have to be
equalized between spouses. Third, the right to manage and control
community property during marriage would have to be given to both
spouses. With respect to these areas of California's community property
system there appears to be no basis upon which current sexual classifica-
tions could be upheld under the Equal Rights Amendment.
Carol Ann Wendelin
